Good afternoon, and thank you for coming to today's MWI speaker event with Dr. James Giordano.
Dr. Giordano is a professor in the Department of Neurology and Biochemistry, Chief of the
Neuroethics Studies Program of the Pellegrino Center for Clinic Bioethics, and Co-Director
of the O'Neill Pellegrino Program in Brain Science and Global Health Law and Policy at
Georgetown University Medical Center.
As well, Dr. Giordano currently serves as an appointed member of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services Secretary Advisory Council on Human Research Protections.
He's a researcher and task leader of the European Union Human Brain Project, and has served
as an appointed member of the Neuroethics Legal and Social Issues Advisory Panel of
the Defense Advanced Research Project.
Projects Agency, DARPA, and Senior Advisory Fellow of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment
Branch of the Joint Staff of the Pentagon.
That's quite a bit.
In his spare time, he has authored over 260 publications in neuroscience and neuroethics,
seven books, and 13 government white papers on neurotechnology, ethics, and biosecurity,
and is an editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities
in Medicine.
Dr. Giordano, thank you for joining us today.
Thank you very much.
No, no, don't applaud now.
Wait until the end, because the performance pressure is much too severe if you do that.
And my thought is you're probably not going to applaud at the end, but what I'm going
to hear is the slamming shut of your sphincters with fear.
That's good.
That's been successful.
It's a pleasure to be here.
It's a real honor to be here.
Is Cadet Yoshi in the audience?
Hello.
No PDAs, but I do want you to come up and say hello.
Your mother says hello.
I'm just, everybody has a mother.
I know hers.
So what we're here to talk about today is the fact that the brain.
Is, and will be, the 21st century battlescape in many ways.
End of story.
We could stop it there, and I could let you go back to your respective units and think
about that for a while, but I'm here to tell you absolutely as much as there's a big old
Tirolian nose on this face, that you will encounter some form of neurocognitive science
that has been weaponized not only in your military career, but in your personal and
professional lives, irrespective of whether those two things coincide or not.
So the idea of the brain as the battlescape is very important, and more importantly is
this other acronym that's up there, which is WMD squared.
Please get used to this, because this is going to be part of the idea of a regular warfare
and ongoing military innovation in your careers.
Weapons of mass destruction and disruption.
Disruption and influence will be the key to creating peer capabilities and asymmetrical
engagements.
Let me say it again.
It will be the key to creating peer capability and asymmetrical relations and engagements.
If we talk about what brain science is, let me just give you a little.
A little bit of brief background on this field that is now called neuroscience.
As a titular field, as a named field, neuroscience has only been in existence for 40 years.
I know that, because I've been a neuroscientist for about 38 of those 40 years.
When I first applied to get into a program in neuroscience, there were only four neuroscience
programs in the continental United States, four.
Right now, at this particular point, there are well over 200 dedicated university and
collegiate programs, several programs at the junior college level, several programs at
the high school level.
There are many, many dozens of independent think tanks and philanthropic organizations
solely devoted to brain sciences.
That's just here in the United States.
Furthermore, what becomes critically important for you to understand is that brain science
is not just a United States enterprise or effort, nor is it singularly an effort of
the United States allies worldwide.
Increasingly, it is becoming an international, multinational, global, and independently exercised
event and endeavor.
Which increases the capability of the brain.
In addition, brain science has developed not only new theories, but ever more sophisticated
tools.
I like this slide a lot, because what it presents for you, ladies and gentlemen, is a century-long
history of brain science, even before it was called neuroscience.
Look, let's face it.
For as long as human beings were looking in some reflective pool and recognized that the
thing looking back at them was themselves, there was some interest in what makes me me.
What makes me think?
What makes me feel?
What makes me behave the way I do and you behave and think the way you do?
What is my sense of self?
Do I have free will, and what is the nature of that, and how can we affect that in a variety
of ways that go from the non-kinetic all the way to the kinetic?
If we take centenary jumps into the era of the Enlightenment, we can see the great thinkers
that came before and during the Enlightenment, inclusive, but not limited to people like
Rene Descartes, pondered the idea of what that means.
Cogito ergo sum, I think, therefore I am.
The inverse of the statement that in many cases was implicit, but now becomes ever more
explicit is, what makes me think?
And if I can understand what makes me think, and makes you think, and makes you feel, then
that understanding may in fact flavor, if not directly influence the way you and I interact.
But more than that, if in fact I understand how it is that your brain does what your brain
does, I may be able to access your brain and affect your brain indirectly and directly.
And what this allows us to do is to create tremendous potential and possibility and probability,
potential.
Possibility.
Probability.
Probability.
And probability of what the brain sciences can do and will do.
Remember these three letters, A, A, and A. Keep them as your viable mantra for the duration
of this course, today, and throughout your professional careers and each and all of the
opportunities that you have to interface and try to understand the power that the brain
and cognitive sciences can yield.
A, the ability to assess the brain and its functions.
A, the ability to access the brain on a variety of levels, from the subcellular all the way
to the social.
And A, the ability to affect the brains and the individuals in which those brains are
embodied and the ecologies in which those individuals enact, engage, encounter, from
the level of the individual to the group, to the community, to the population.
Look at the power that understanding tools and techniques of the brain sciences afford.
It's there before you on the screen.
Thank you.
Obviously, if in fact this gives me some insight to the way people interact, inclusive
of the way they may interact in bellicose, aggressive, violent, and volatile ways, and
it also confers upon me certain powers to be able to influence that, alter that, change
that, mitigate that, then clearly I'm able to use the brain sciences as we have tried
repeatedly in the past to influence the postures and capabilities not only of our own individuals
who are engaged in warfare, intelligence, and national security operations.
Thank you.
national security operations, but those who seek to threaten us.
In other words, we can utilize these things in national security,
intelligence, and defense.
Please look at the timeline.
A mere ten years ago, 2008, the National Academy of Sciences National Research
Council convened a group to create a report dedicated to if and why and
how brain sciences might be viable, valid, and of value in national security,
intelligence, and defense operations.
And in 2008, they did a five-year retrospective and
came to the conclusion that although these things may be valid,
their relative viability, value at that particular time,
rendered them not ready for prime time play.
Our group, working with others internationally inclusive of the Nuffield
Council in the UK, proceeded forward from 2008 and did a slightly deeper dive,
looking at international capabilities, limitations, and
delimitations in the brain sciences, and came to a very, very different set
of conclusions.
Not only were the brain sciences increasingly being considered,
interested, and used for possibilities of national security, intelligence,
and defense, but they would continue to be so as more and more countries
internationally developed the capabilities and the specialized agendas to be able
to look into the brain and affect the brain.
So much so that by 2014, the exact same committee reconvened and recognized at
that time that the brain sciences indeed were ready and in operational prime time
for warfare, intelligence, and
national security agenda.
In other words, it is valid, valuable, and already in operational play.
The brain is the current and future battle space, or at least one that can be
leveraged in those ways to be able to create tremendous effect with fairly
little investment of engagement.
In other words, what it allows us to do is assess the brain, access the brain, and
affect the brain.
I'll unapologetically repeat myself throughout this lecture to drive home this
point with regard to these cases.
I'm going to give you a brief overview of the various key capabilities that are
involved in the brain in terms of the brain's ability to respond to these
capabilities, because each and all have gravitas importance and operational
leverage ability.
That said, what are these techniques and technologies that have rendered this
capability and, if you will, geopolitical, military, and social power?
Well, I have them here before you.
Generalization, we could parse them out into two discrete domains.
First, the assessment neurotechnologies that do exactly as the name would imply.
They are, based upon, various tools that we can use to assess the brain's ability to respond to these capabilities.
those structures and functions of the brain
that may be involved in those processes of cognition,
emotion, and behaviors.
Humans are tool users.
Rarely, however, do we turn over a rock,
look around a corner, or appear under the bed
just to know what's under there.
We use, at very, very least, the knowledge
we have gained from turning the rock over and looking
under the bed around the corner, and very often
those things that we find under the rock, under the bed,
or around the corner become tools
for us to use in a variety of other engagements.
Brain science, like any other
science and technology, is no different.
Earlier in the day
at lunch, Major and I
had a conversation about the viability of different types of
research. Science for science's
sake. Science just to know because
that's where your interests lie.
Oh, look, I've been an academic for well
over four decades, and I can tell
you that that kind of research is wonderful.
But when that research is generated
for a purpose, and when it's funded, and when
that purpose deals with those things
that are near and dear
to the health, survivability,
flourishing, and protection of kith and kin,
then that research is operational
research that has an end goal of
use. This is what this is
about. It's not just a question of trying
to figure out what makes the brain tick
in the way it's built. It's can we
get in there to affect the ticking and talking,
and by affecting the way that brain is built
and the way it functions, influence
in ways that are kinetic and non-kinetic
the attitudes,
beliefs, thoughts, emotions,
activities, and relative
vulnerabilities and predispositions of those who are not.
It's about those individuals for whom both we are
responsible in terms of our own forces,
perhaps to make them better, more insulated
against injury, operationally protected
and enhanced, and those who may
threaten us. To do that,
we need to intervene.
So the other dimension of these neurotechnologies
are interventional neurotechnologies.
Now, I'm not going to bring you down the rabbit hole
into what each and all of these things do,
because you don't want to be a neuroscientist,
and I'm certainly not going to make you a neuroscientist
in an hour. But I think it becomes important
to dial into a little bit more clarity, and with
further granularity, what we're really
talking about when we talk about these relative
assessment and interventional technologies.
In the former case,
probably the one that gives the most rise
to both provocation and contention,
are various forms of neuroimaging, the ability
to image the living brain,
to be able to see what brain areas
are differentially active as we engage in
different thoughts, feelings, emotions,
and tasks. And to then correlate
the interaction of those nodes and networks
with discrete patterns that occur not only
in individuals, but in groups of individuals.
In other words, if I can see how this gentleman
brain works, whether he's awake or falling
asleep, the idea
there is that I can then understand,
I'm only kidding, I can only understand better
not only what makes him
happy, agitated,
engaged, or tired, but I can
then in some way alter my discourse
to be able to make him feel happier,
more engaged, and less tired.
In so doing, I can take
the information I have about the way a brain
works, and I can put it to good use
practical use. Think about
this. If I know what makes you
tick as an individual, and I'm then
able to generate patterns
of how you as an individual relate
to, are similar to,
or different from other individuals,
I may be able to then generate
information that allows me to interact
with you on ways that are more meaningful
to our level of interaction. In other words,
the more I know about what makes you tick,
the more my interactions can be geared with you
to make you tick the way I want you to.
The way I want you to.
Obviously it takes
some energy to put people into a big magnet
and scan their brain. There's a whole bunch of things
that are limitations of brain imaging.
We recognize that. That's part of the mission.
We seek to delimit those
particular constraints and through the use of co-registered
different forms of neuroimaging make it better.
Some of these forms of neuroimaging
are fieldable, operationalizable
in field missions. Some of them are not.
We're seeking to make these things
more operationalizable, not only
for military medicine to assess individuals
who may have incurred brain injury
and or the effects of brain injury inclusive
of things like PTSD and other forms
of neuropsychiatric disorders,
but also to understand better how it is
that our individuals are able to think through certain
situations, how their brains work,
and be able to classify those individuals
and perhaps specify the way we train them,
where we sustain that training,
and then we maximize their performance.
We can use other methods as well.
Genetics, biomarkers,
and information. And that information
is critical. One of the things you must learn
is as military personnel,
your demographic, biological, social,
and psychological information exists in your jacket
and is in fact retrievable in real time.
That information becomes ever more
important as we try to understand the you-ness
of you. And the nature to
classify that information, hold that information
secure, doesn't only exist on the medical
side with regard to your HIPAA records,
but increasingly is becoming a concern for national
security when these large-scale,
big databases of brain structure
and function, physiology,
biopsychosocial demographics become
ever more available and ever more relevant
to what's making you tick, what's making you
talk, what's making you strong, what's making
you vulnerable. And the fact that other
nations, inclusive of China and Russia,
are engaging in large-scale
neuro-big-data initiatives to be able
to create large-scale databases
that can join not only imaging and physiological
but as well as other forms of phenotypic
and genetic data of the entirety
of populations renders great power
because there is great capability
in that information to know where
key points of strength and vulnerability may lie
and also to intercede, to engage
and to inject information in to in some way
be able to affect what appears to be
your medical record, your personal
record, the evidence that is you.
And we can take that step
to go one step further. The more I know
about you and the more I know about the way
your brain works as individuals,
groups, communities, even populations,
the more I can utilize non-kinetic
means such as informational means
of narratives,
iconographies, semiotics,
to influence your
emotions and your behaviors.
We can do this subliminally through
computer images. We can do this more
liminally through the types of engagement interactions
that we engage through psychological operations
and informational operations.
We can train better our human terrain teams
to be able to interact with individuals in a variety
of cultures, groups, settings, and
ecologies to improve their performance
so as to be less distancing and more
ameliorating.
We can go further than that as well.
We can also utilize these interventional technologies
in those ways that may be able to
directly affect the brain.
Probably the one that you've heard about most
recently, most contemporarily in
the literature, is the possibility
to use some form of directed energy to
affect physiology peripherally and also
to affect the physiology and health of the brain.
Case in point here, U.S.
Embassy personnel in Havana and possibly
in China. And of course,
there's not a lot that I can tell you about that, although I am
one of the researchers on that particular project.
But this seems to be wholly indicative and supportive
of the fact that this was at least
some form of directed energy, whether it was
wholly intentional or not, still remains
to be definitively decided.
However, the pattern
of insult and injury to those individuals
and the pattern of injury of
who was affected strongly suggests that
this was an intentional and directed engagement
and that this represents a beta test,
a possible probe of a directed
energy neuro weapon. And there are a number
of countries that have developed initiatives
and agenda towards developing just these types
of things, the United States included.
But you also have a whole host of other things
that can go bump and bang in your brain.
The more we understand the specificity
of the brain on a very granular level,
the more we're able to derive and
develop particular types of drugs that
not only can enhance and optimize the performance
of our people, but can also be
used to mitigate, militate, and in some cases
manifest profound morbid changes
in their people. In other words,
against a hostile other.
Drugs can be exceedingly specific
and, as I'll show you in a moment, can be very,
very much used to individualize weaponology
in terms of what we call precision pathology
or precision effect. We can go
further. Clearly, one of the things we can also
do is transcranial neuromodulation,
the idea of going through the skull
to modulate the node and network activity
of the brain, to optimize the performance
of key individuals in certain tasks
and performances that are relatively to their
missional space. And we can also do that
against hostile or perhaps belligerent others.
We can go further to implant
certain brain-machine interfaces. These are
many of the DARPA programs that you may hear of now.
Probably the one that is most notorious
in a very good sense is something called
the N3 program, which is the non-invasive
neurosurgical neuromodulation program
being run by their program manager,
Dr. Al Mundi. The idea here is to
put minimal-sized electrodes
in a network within a brain through only minimal
intervention to be able to read and write
into the brain function
in real time, remotely.
The United States is not alone in such efforts.
And then, of course, you also have the things
that are a little bit more traditional. If we talk about
things that can be operable in the biochemical space,
we ordinarily talk about drugs,
bugs,
toxins, and ever more
we're considering devices.
At the last Biological Toxins
and Weapons Convention,
at the RevCon, it was then raised by the Australia
group that we need to be a little bit more salient
in our attention to those possible
neurotechnological devices that may be able to be weaponized.
Our group has also
argued that the current considerations
and extant categories of the Biological Toxins
and Weapons Convention are not detailed
enough to be able to appreciate
or keep pace with the advances
in this form of science that can be weaponized
that poses a risk and threat on the
battle space. So,
how then can we use these
elements as weapons?
Means of contending against
others. Formal definition of a weapon,
right under the Oxford Old English Dictionary.
Means of contending against others.
And we can do that in a number of ways.
We can militate their
behaviors and their thoughts in some ways
as to make them more amenable to what we do,
the idea of positive weaponology.
Or we can, in fact, mitigate
and in some cases completely nullify
their capability, will,
or engagement
to fight.
If we combine those two definitions
into one, what we find is those agents
that will either change individuals
thoughts, vulnerabilities, volatility
to violence and aggression, or incur
morbidity, dysfunction,
and or mortality
in such a way as to then mitigate
the engagement altogether.
You still with me? That said,
we can break down any form of weaponology
into two discrete categories.
Soft weapons
and hard weapons.
The former categorization, soft weapons include
but are not limited to such things like economic
leveraging to create economics,
market values, market presence,
presence at international bargaining tables
to develop international power
and leverage, as a soft weapon.
Clearly the more we're able to make an impact
in a field, in a dimension,
by virtue of research, medicine,
technology,
infiltration to a variety of areas of the public
space, the more we're able to yield
economic strong-arming, economic leveraging.
I think an important consideration
that I'll reiterate later in this particular lecture
is that there are countries outside the United States
and or the West that are increasing
their capabilities by intent in the brain sciences
so as to be able to gain this type of
economic leveraging in international global markets
in medicine, science technology,
and the military.
Most notably among them
is China. We'll talk more about that momentarily.
We can also utilize weapons
in more of a soft approach, as I mentioned earlier.
The more I know about what makes you tick,
the more I might be able to do things like
weaponize, the approach that I then take towards
you and my interactions and engagements with you.
Here we can utilize the brain sciences
for psychological operations.
Most notably, one of the DARPA programs
run by the case manager, by the program
manager Bill Kaysbier, Dr. Bill Kaysbier,
who subsequently went on to be
a program manager at Lockheed Martin
and run their brain machine interfacing programs.
Bill Kaysbier's program was called
Narrative Networks. And one component
of the Narrative Networks project was something
called Neural Narratives. If we understand
how it is that brains and individuals, groups,
and populations respond to certain forms
of messaging, memes, iconographies,
engagements, the more
we may be able to tailor those things
through our psychological operations,
propaganda, miso, to be able to engage
these individuals in more positive ways
or in ways that are more influential,
to be able to direct their behaviors,
their predispositions, and perhaps their engagements
with us on a variety of levels from the individual
all the way up to the political.
But then, of course, we move into the more
harder forms of weapons, things such as
bullets and bombs. And here once again,
let me reiterate what we're talking about
here, suicide, drugs,
bugs, toxins,
and devices.
But of course, if we spill over the idea
of soft weaponology into a hard
weaponization, we also see
the use of bio data
as a viable weapon.
Manipulating bio data so that I can
then put into your particular medical records
subtle information that may change
the disposition of whether you're sick or not,
change how you're treated, influence
the postures that go to you in terms of
insurance, care, viability,
for military service. By
altering that information, by changing those
data, by purloining those data, I essentially
change the you of you.
And I can do that in very subtle and
insidious ways. Furthermore,
I can do that on a variety of different levels
that can affect key individuals
so that in fact your medical record changes
to thereby render you incapable
or at least invalid to be able to serve in a way
you're serving. Or I can do that
on a much larger scale. Groups,
populations. And if I change
those data, I change the way you're being
regarded and treated. And I can do that in one
of two ways. I can do it in such a way that you're
going to be regarded in a negative sense,
or I can do it in such a way that I'm going to treat you
incorrectly. If I say, for example,
you have a particular allergy, or you have
particular sensitivities, or you have a particular
disorder, you will be treated for that. And that
could then harm your health and your
stability in both a short war's approach
as well as a long war's approach.
But if we take a look at this
in a little more detail, you can
see that once again it falls back to the idea
of what can we do to ours,
and what can be done to others.
Clearly,
one dimension, one domain of
operational viability and value
is to enhance the capabilities
of the combat and intelligence operator
across a range of scale abilities
in both general purpose and more select
forces. And this is the idea
of neuroenablement.
Neuroenablement.
You will hear this referred to in a variety
of different ways. Performance
optimization. Enhancement.
Enablement.
Maximization.
These terms mean
something. A number of years ago our
group was tasked with the Air Force to develop a
lexicon, a nomenclature, that would be able
to define these in more precise ways.
I'm not going to bore you with that now.
But the idea of enablement gives forth, I think,
a particular meaning that's relevant.
You're enabling individuals to do some
aspects of a performance of a task
that is germane and justified
to their operational mission
and that is in fact done
with regard to protection of their charges.
So in other words, we're saying
we're going to make you good to go when we've decided
that this is good. The reason
this can become problematic, of course,
is that what definition of good
are we using? What we define,
whoever the proverbial we may be,
to be good, might be quite different than
what they, whoever the proverbial they is.
And as a consequence, we have to keep a much
broader window of opportunity and possibility
open to be aware for the potential
benefits, burdens, and risks that this
type of engagement may pose.
What types of things can we do to make
our people better, if you will?
Well, certainly we can use a variety of advanced
psychopharmacologics and neuropharmacologics.
In other words, drugs. And I refer you to
a wonderful book written by a colleague of mine,
Professor Jonathan Moreno, called Mind Wars.
First edition came out in 2006.
Second edition came out in 2012.
And Professor Moreno does a very good job
in defining and explaining
the history and historicity of the way
the brain and cognitive sciences had been used
in national security, intelligence, and defense
operations, both by the United States
and more globally.
And what we see is that this is certainly not a new event.
We can look back into antiquity and see
that there have been attempts to try to
maximize the performance capability,
sustainability, and protection
of those individuals who are operational
war fighters, literally
from ancient Rome and Greece all
the way to the 20th and now 21st
century.
It's the tools and techniques based upon
the understanding and depth that we have
that increases the granularity and
specificity of effect and increases
sophistication and gravitas about
the outcome. The more we know about
the brain, the more we can develop ever more
selective agents to affect
the structures and functions of the brain
in cognition, emotion, and actions,
and the more we can do so in a way that's more like
sharpshooting rather than buckshotting.
But irrespectively,
drugs can be somewhat dirty.
What I mean by that is they can have a host
of adverse effects, some of them side effects,
some of them direct effects, and very
often what we'll find is that unless we're able to deliver the drugs
directly to a particular site in the brain or
elsewhere in the nervous system, they can have
heterogeneity of effects throughout the body,
and that can lead us to some undesirable outcomes.
But we don't need to be limited to drugs.
No, no, no. We can also
use a variety of computational brain machine
interfaces that are both closed and open loop,
and these include things like
transcranial magnetic and electrical stimulation,
stimulating the vagus nerve
transdermally, or if you wanted to get
somewhat more invasive but certainly more
specific, brain machine interfaces
by virtue of deep brain and superficial
brain implants.
And I shall tell you that one of the leading
projects in developing state of the
art brain implants is a DARPA
funded project aimed at the medical side for the
treatment of neurological and neuropsychiatric
spectrum disorders, and this program is called
SUBNETS, Systems Based
Neurotechnologies for Emerging Therapies.
But what you also need to appreciate
is that that DARPA program, like any
program that is oriented towards engaging
brain function to then alter those
functions in certain ways, directional
ways, can be harnessed for what's called
dual use, medical purposes that are
then de-purposed to medicine and used for
other agenda, inclusive of
warfighter enablement and enhancement.
Furthermore, we understand that there are a number
of nations outside the United States,
some of whom are allied, others that
are at least competitive if not combative,
that are engaged in these types of programs
looking at the capability for transcranial
and deep intracranial
modulation of brain function to
improve the functional performance
of military and intelligence operators
across a range of viable missional tasks.
We are not alone in these
pursuits, and I think that's something that needs
to be appreciated. But it's not just
a question of what we can do to our own,
because very often in raising these questions
we tend to what I call err on the side
of moral probity, and we recognize
that there are particular limitations, limits,
boundaries, thresholds, that
cannot and perhaps should not be crossed
in terms of what we can do. And if we intend
to cross them, we only cross them with consent,
and that consent is highly contingent
upon the necessity of a continuity
of research and clinical care,
understanding what happens to the individual
once they've been enabled and enhanced,
and what may happen when they're no longer enabled
and enhanced. In other words, more colloquially,
when Superman goes back to being Clark Kent,
what happens to Clark becomes
the burden and obligation of our responsibility.
However, those
ethics are not homogeneous
on the world stage, and
the idea of pushing the envelope of what can
be done to the combat
warfighter and intelligence operator
and perhaps more broadly
to those individuals who may oppose particular
regimes and or maybe
military fighters against your own regime
is very often bounded by
and in some cases deconstricted by
philosophies, cultures, and ethics of those
individuals who may be competitive
if not combative to us. So in other words,
this can also be weaponized against others.
And this is where we get into the idea
of novel neuro-weapons.
Once again, this is not necessarily new,
but the momentum of this
dimension of the field has accelerated
as a consequence of increased understanding
of the brain and increased capability
to develop tools and techniques to
access and affect the brain.
So what are we seeing here? Well,
take a look. We see in-close
neuro-pharmaceuticals and organic toxins.
What's new about this
is the in-close nature of this.
Increasingly, we're not seeing these
things as weapons of mass destruction
against gross aspects of the population.
Although, certainly,
many neuro-weapons such as sarin gas
and VX and other forms of neurotoxic
agents can be leveraged against large
groups of people, but that's messy.
More specifically, perhaps,
might be targeting individuals on a
level that allows either direct attribution
or covert engagement with non-attribution.
Let me give you an example
of what I mean. So this gentleman
is the leader of some group,
a political group, a social group,
a combative group, and under the
veil of a white flag, he and I
are now to have some kind of a caucus, a meeting.
And during that meeting, what I do is I
lace the rim of his drink
or his pen or his seat
or something in his immediate
environment with very, very
low-dose drug or toxins that
are going to affect his stability.
They may affect the way his
brain works, and
as a consequence of that, they can affect the functions
of his brain, his thought patterns,
his relative emotionality,
and the behaviors that go along with that.
One of two things might happen.
He might be completely incapacitated
as a consequence of this, or he
may change his level of capacity and engagement
so that he went into the meeting thinking,
I hate this guy. This guy's my enemy.
He walks out of the meeting going, I love this guy.
This guy's great.
What could happen if, in fact,
this is a gentleman who has
charismatic, financial,
elected, or dictatorial
power? It may be that his
followers will then follow him blindly.
He came into the meeting
as a leader of those followers who were
bellicose, who were volatile,
who were violent and aggressive.
He comes out of the meeting, he tells them to change
their behaviors, and they do.
Or, I could
sever the trust. By now,
he leaves this meeting
he's espousing a very different philosophical
stance and orientation,
and his followers no longer adhere
to his precepts, his tenets, or his
lead, and I fractured the relative
arrangement of trust,
engagement, capability
that he fostered,
leaving that population
disrupted and vulnerable to intervention,
to a coup d'etat,
to a junta, to some type of
insertive reassumption of leadership.
You see how this can work?
Furthermore, I can use
this very tactically.
Some of these agents allow me to assemble the agent
on site and not have to stockpile it,
which allows me to take the components of this agent
into and out of a country
relatively covertly, target a
specific individual, change or
eliminate that individual with very little attribution
and trace, and be able to leave
prior to any attribution.
Think Novichok.
Or, I could assemble very small
quantities of this that would then allow
a specific intervention
characteristically in a place that would not allow
an intervention. Think of the use of
a derivative of VX
in an airport.
But I could do more than that.
I could also incur much broader type of
ripple effects. And one of the ways I could also
do that is with what's called high
morbidity neuro-microbiologic
agents. It's a real fancy way of saying
neuro-bugs. But high morbidity
neuro-bugs. I may not want to kill
a lot of people. In fact, arguably,
I may assume what is sometimes referred
to as the sailor malin mantra.
For those of you who may be
fans or students of military history,
you may remember that Sailor Malin,
Wing Commander Sailor Malin,
was a South African who flew with the Royal Air Force
during the Second World War. And he became
well known during the Battle of Britain
for shooting up German airplanes
but letting them limp home, particularly
bomber aircraft. And they would ask
Sailor Malin, oh Wing Commander, why didn't
you shoot that plane down? And his
adage was simple. Better to have
that plane return home
with wounded crew who are spitting up
their lungs, one dead crewman
that they had to attend to and therefore
divert their missional capability while in flight
than shoot them down.
Because the psychological effect will be
rippling and devastating. This is
sometimes referred to as the malin effect.
What can I do? I can use
a particular bug that I may be able to now
modify through the use of gene
editing technique that is ubiquitously
available and fairly easy to use
to take a bug that was previously
relatively benign and
non-pathogenic and make that
bug virulent. Pathogenic
dangerous. And then
what could I do? I could introduce that
bug in key sites.
Des Moines. Seattle.
Tampa.
Newark. Houston.
I'd get a few people sick. I'd do it
on an airplane. Do it at an airport.
Do it at a sporting event. Do it on Black
Friday. And then what
I would do is I would take credit for that but I'd want to make
sure that at least part of the symptomatic constellation
was not only neurological
but profoundly psychological.
Agitation. Debilitation.
Sweating.
Stomach problems. Sleeplessness.
Cardiac problems. Things that are
what we call top down neurological in their
effect. Brain to body and body to
brain in the bottom up
cascade. Then what I would
do is I would get on the internet
and I would put out over the internet,
I did it. Oh yes.
I'm that dangerous G group
that you should all be afraid of.
And in fact, this is far more ubiquitous
than I let on. These are only
the first cases. I've let
these buggies go all over the country
and your early warning signs are agitation,
anxiety,
worry, sleeplessness,
stomach problems, heart problems.
What have I done?
I've rippled the sheets of the worried
well. At first blush I get
every hypochondriac running to their physician
but at second and third blush
I get those individuals who begin to
become worried that they may have been exposed to this.
That their children may have been exposed to this.
That their loved ones, their kin, their kith
may have been exposed to this.
Of course, the physicians, the CDC,
the public health service comes back
and says, no, no.
That's not what's going on. But I get back on the internet
and I say, oh don't you listen
to that. That's fake.
That's false. Your government knows
what's going on. They can't do anything
about it and they can't treat you.
They're going to end up quarantining you.
How many people would I need to affect?
We modeled it.
Somewhere between 12 and 240.
What would be
the effect? Hang on folks.
Within 41 to 45 days
we would crash the United States public health system.
Crash it.
In so doing, I render the United States
infrastructure vulnerable.
Either there or elsewhere.
See the ripple effect? See the disruptive effect?
I can disrupt an individual
from the level of their cell to their system
and disrupt individuals
on a variety of levels
from individuals all the way up
to the social fabric. And that social fabric
may go even further. It may be
geopolitical. I need you to think
just for a moment, if you could,
why would it be of any value at all
to affect, disrupt,
and disable individuals
who are U.S. embassy personnel
in Havana?
When did it happen?
What was happening?
What would be the benefit
in fracturing a growing economic,
political, and social trust
in that part of the world?
Who would benefit?
What would be the long term
effects, for example, of at
least indicating that U.S. embassy personnel
and foreign service personnel
are vulnerable to these types of threats?
Could you impact,
pair the threat with some type of
conditioned stimulus so now what you're able
to do is to evoke
a response in the worried well?
I only offer
possible suggestions for your
speculation and your
consideration,
if you will. We can even go further.
One of the newest developments
is that nanoparticulate matter
can be stabilized
for distribution.
If you're not aware of what nanoparticulate matter
is, it's that matter which exists on a scale
of one times ten to the minus
ninth. Very, very small. Smaller
than a cell. And we can
manufacture materials that have
discrete properties that can be controlled by
virtue of bioengineering and their physical chemistry.
To autoaggregate,
to be able to aggregate in particular areas
based upon their biological and their chemical
sensitivity. But now we go
one step further. Most
recently, just a few weeks ago, it was
announced that you could then aerosolize
nanomaterials. And go one
step further, I can create small
robotic units, controllable
robotic units at the nanoscale
and that these too can be
aerosolized to create
a nanoswarm of
biopenetrable materials that you cannot see
that can penetrate
all but the most robust biochemical
filters that are able to
integrate themselves through a variety of membranes,
mucus membranes and wherever,
mouth, nose, ears, eyes.
Can be then uptaken
into the vascular system to create clumping.
Can affect the vascular
system of the brain or can directly diffuse into
the brain space and these can be weaponized.
And they can be done in such a level
that their presence is
almost impossible to detect
and as such the attribution becomes exceedingly
difficult to demonstrate.
How much of this material would I need?
Take a look.
This is the front of my pen.
This amount of nanomaterials
if be able to maintain and sustain
with regard to its deliverability and aerosolization
could in fact affect
all of you or
based upon where I come from, New York City, all yous.
Look at this.
Look at this. I'm carrying
that material. Would you see it?
Would I have to lug a giant weapon into the room?
No, I wouldn't. And what if in fact
I utilize some form of
an unmanned aerial device or unmanned
ground device as a delivery vehicle?
Something like a drone or a bug.
Could I do something with that?
But let's keep going. Could I also
utilize a whole host of devices
to be able to affect individuals
close in, for example during
interrogations, during social engagements,
during human terrain team engagements
or more remotely? In a room?
In a theater?
In an airplane? In a bus?
In a store? In a mall?
The answer is increasingly
yes.
So this then represents for us both a challenge
and an opportunity. The challenge
is that increasingly what we find is that neuroscience
and technology is relatively easy
to obtain. Many of the things
that I've just spoken to you about
are viable and obtainable directly
to the consumer or directly to the scientist.
We also know that many of the products
that are available direct to the consumer can be easily
modified to create things that have
a much higher weaponization potential.
But more than that, we also recognize
that there are dedicated efforts on the part
of nation states and even groups of
non-state actors and increasingly
virtual nations that are using virtual
currencies to fund research
efforts in these areas.
I'd like to think that I'm a smart guy talking
to a bunch of very intelligent individuals,
but let's face it, we're not the only smart
people in the world. And if we're thinking
this way, there are plenty of other people who
are thinking this way too. Some of them
are our allies, some of them may be our
competitors, and some of them are combatants
and hostiles. And this is in fact
the reality. Furthermore,
we recognize that the goal
particularly among the actions of the
United States and her allies is to
fight for right and honor, but to keep
our own honor clean, to take
the moral high ground, if you will.
And indeed, that has
been the case in the majority of the United States
engagements throughout our history.
However, one of the things that may
creep up here is that there's something of an
abrogation, a prohibition, a proscription
against engaging this
type of research in its possible translation
in the civilian sector.
You heard earlier in the very nice introduction that Captain
Bender afforded me that I've had the opportunity to work
with the European Union Human Brain Project
specifically as a task leader for
dual-use brain science. And one of the
considerations that grew out of that was that
absolutely none of those projects in the
Human Brain Project, again a multinational
effort, can and should
be uptaken into warfare,
intelligence, and national security agenda.
That's viable
enough. The idea there is that
these things should be used for only peaceful means.
However, this also
creates a challenge. And the challenge
is simple. If in fact
I choose not to train
in particular ways, I choose
not to train three days a week,
if in fact those individuals who may
choose to then conflict with me
will then train in the ways
that I do not, and train on the days
of the week that I will not,
they may opportunize
a select advantage.
What do we do about that?
Again, I think it becomes at least
a problematic issue for discourse because we
recognize that in many cases the civilian sector
not only is not amenable
to engaging in this type of research, certainly
many are, but in some cases
should not engage in this type of research
for those very proscriptions that I
alluded to momentarily.
However, the question
then becomes, how do we appreciate
the international challenge,
risk, and threat that
the advancements of the brain sciences
and cognitive sciences offer for global
weaponization with the brain as the
next battlescape? Clearly
it defines some type of a solution space
and there have been those that have posited,
myself included, that there should be more
directed, more detailed, and more dedicated
government efforts in this particular domain
so able to advance the brain sciences
ways with sustainable funding to understand
what the potential risks and threats
are and to develop a stance of
preparedness. This becomes
increasingly important when we take a look at those
countries that have notable and identified
programs of high
level of investment of GDP
and your other levels of economic investment
to advance the brain sciences in those
ways that are either directly usable
or have some, what I would call
explicit dual use capability.
An important consideration that I
want you all to bear
is that current estimates based
upon trend analysis is that by
2025, greater
than 50% of research development
test evaluation and possible use
of brain sciences in general
will occur outside
the west.
Outside the west. Furthermore
we understand that there has been a directed effort
in China to be able to engage the current
and future five year plans
to be able to advance brain science and those
ways to be able to have
a higher level of gravitas with regard to
the research, its capability and its translation
in medicine and other agenda
inclusive possible dual use and direct
use within warfare, intelligence
and national security.
This creates opportunities for research
tourism, medical tourism
and market capture. And again
that market capture can be leveraged as
economic warfare in terms of being
able to destabilize the
global market and the global economics
that is relevant upon this form of
science and technology.
But we also recognize that these things are being
used for military applications
certainly there are directed opportunities
and directed agendas for doing that
within China. We also recognize
that there have been activities
and directed initiatives in the former Soviet
Union that have now been translated and perpetuated
into the current Russian infrastructure
biomedical science for military purposes
and a number of other countries have directed
efforts in this
space inclusive of Iran
North Korea
India, Bolivia
certainly among the US and its allies
we recognize that, the United States
UK, Canada
Israel and there are governmental efforts
within Europe, we recognize also there are efforts
in Japan. But there is another
looming threat
the threat is the non-state actor
the threat is the virtual nation
to establish sovereignty within
a sovereignty so as to be able to say that
we are immune or inured to your
rules and regulations. Essentially
possibly destructive dialogue
in the diaspora. And increasingly
what we are seeing is the use of bitcoin
currencies and the like allow the finances
of these types of things to be sustained
in ways that were heretofore economically
unimaginable if not
incapable. So as a consequence
what we are recognizing is that the threat parameters
the risk parameters as well as the challenge
and opportunity parameters are growing
we are equally concerned about
the do it yourself community
not because this community of biohackers
represents an inherently malicious or nefarious
group but because of their
relative vulnerability to infiltration
and we recognize that to such an extent
that at present the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in this country has dedicated
ongoing efforts to try to maintain
continued communication
interaction and engagement with this community
so as to be able to better surveil
their relative vulnerability to
purloinment, infiltration, manipulation
and misuse. Clearly
if we are looking at these things as possible
destructive weapons, the more characteristic
or classic criteria of drugs
bugs and toxins
meet at least some of the extant
categorizations of the biological
toxins, weapons and chemical conventions
however
as disruptive agents
as those agents that may be
assembled, developed anew
that do not meet these criteria
you can then get skirting
of these extant treaties
and these extant signatory documents
and as a consequence can develop
these means, these methods, tools
and technologies essentially
below the radar. Moreover
as disruptive elements
they need not be mass produced or stockpiled
but rather
their ingenuity is that they are able to be assembled
in situ in relatively low quantities
and used with specific effects
against individuals and small groups
to be able to incur disruptive effects
not only within that organism
or that group of organisms
but beyond the organismic level
to the systems level, to the social level
to the geopolitical level
there is great power that can be leveraged there
clearly what we can do is provocative
therefore
what we should do remains at issue
ladies and gentlemen I do not have answers for you
but I will pose several questions and possibilities
one of the things we have to understand
is that this represents if you will
a bioscientific speedway
consider the true speedway
lots of entries, I've already shown you the entries
very fast pace
the speed of translation from concept
to construct in the brain sciences
is about 60 calendar months
and increasingly that's being compressed
so the developments in the brain sciences
to reach a tech readiness level
can be achieved within 48 calendar months
it's very fast
certainly we know not only there are many entries
it's very fast, but the prizes are tremendous
economic prizes
prizes of notoriety in the biomedical front
prizes of power, capability
weaponization on the wins front
weaponization, intelligence
national security
we also recognize
that there are risks and possible harms
not only to those who are on the track
but to those who surround it
the idea is if in fact we're going to move into the space
how can we move into the space
with some prudence
how do we move into the space pragmatically
and how do we move into the space in such a way that is prepared
our group was tasked with developing
these protocols and paradigms
and we refer to them as the operational neurotechnology
risk assessment and mitigation paradigm
the on ramp
to the neurobio technological speedway if you will
I won't bore you by reading the slide
but I do want you to pay particular attention
to the lower box
that's
Zig Brzezinski
in 1970 he was prescient
forethought, foresight
and said in 1970
in the coming decades we will see an increasing
viability and value
being able to affect the neurocognitive space
there was something of the
sort of crystal ball in that statement
we are there
and increasingly we will be ever deeply there
based upon not only our own initiatives
but those initiatives of groups around the country
this is a space
that we need to at least be prepared for
a simple precautionary principle
will no longer obtain
why? number one it shouldn't
number two it's anachronistic
just because we recognize that in some cases
the risks may be high
and there may be certain benefits
a simple precautionary principle says if the risks
or threats outweigh the benefits don't go
however
we need to also be equally preparative
and take a more advanced precautionary principle
that says you must examine the potential
the probability
and the possibilities of what those risks
and threats are relative to the benefits
of a stance of preparedness
and preparedness very often includes engaging
the research to understand how these things work
and how they can be used
how do we do it? well these are some of the contingencies
that I offer simply as proposition
for you I ask you to consider them
number one what is the
technical rightness of any and all form of
neuroscience and technology in these types of agenda
what are key situational
variables that may be germane to its use
or non-use
is there evaluation or some revision
of the various ethical concepts that may be able
to guide these uses in practice
and might we need to develop in some cases
new frameworks new foundations
of ethics that are more applicable
given the fact that the science and technology
may be running at a speed
to which our ethics and policies
may not yet be a pace
I'm not going to bore you with these contingencies
but what I want you to do is pretty much
go down to the very very last one
the idea here is
can we utilize neuroscience
and technology and if the
answer is yes we can should we
and if the answer there is
we already are and there are some
domains and dimensions by which use
should be advocated for example
non-lethality, least harm
doing less harm than
other forms of interventions and engagements
that are currently in use being able
to mitigate individuals capacity
or willingness to engage in volatility
in other words improving
the capacity for individuals
to gain capability to get along
well perhaps there is some value
there if these things are going
to be used in a more hard weaponized approach
are they being used
in those ways that are less harmful than other
extant weapons and or
what are the postures that we should adopt
if in fact another nation utilizes
this form of weaponology what represents
what I would consider to be comparative
or appropriate proportionality
and ultimately if in fact we're
going to move into this space
and I think we are moving into this space
realistically not only now but ever more in the future
we have the obligation and responsibility
to assess whether or not
the contingencies for consent
to treat our own people are in place
in other words if there are things we're going to do
to optimize the performance and capabilities
of our own personnel
and if there are things that are being done
on the world stage inclusive perhaps by us
and our allies that could mitigate
affect or manifest change in other
personnel are we prepared to accept
those responsibilities
the responsibilities for ongoing research
the responsibilities for ongoing clinical care
not only of our
but internationally
because of the role that the United States
and our allies plays and because of the
need to take an upstanding moral front
with regard to the fact that as we develop
weapons and as weapons are developed
by us our allies and by others
the preparedness stands as we must
also be equally assumed
equally in position to be able to not only
counter those weapons but mitigate
and treat the effects that those weapons incur
and in fact historically very often
what we've seen is that that has been the interesting
march of science technology and medicine
where advancements in medicine very often
arise as a consequence of the possible
utility of various forms of science
and tech to be weaponized and the damage
that they incur
but the question still comes up ladies and gentlemen
what ethics shall we use
to guide research test
development and perhaps utilization
of neuroscience and neurotechnology
in these agenda and initiatives
clearly here in the United States
as with any open society
our military has relative transparency
to the polis for our intense
our goals and our operations
absolutely certain things are held confidential
and classified you don't show the other team
your playbook on Friday and expect to win the game
on Sunday yes of course
and information we may understand about
what they're doing by virtue of our deep
and our intermediate surveillance may also be
kept close to the chest
if you will
but the transparency of military intent
operations goals and interventions
here in the United States
has been paramount to the nature
and fabric of our infrastructure
and our government and the same is true
for our allies so at least
part of this needs to be at least relevant
to afforded by
guided through civilian ethics
why because in many
cases it is the civilian institutions
that to date have been involved in at least
some of the research and development that can be up taken into
dual or direct use agendas and as
such these things are subject
to and I think validly subject
to civilian ethics of
science and technology or biomedical
ethics but
if we move increasingly away from that
if we say that indeed
the proscriptions and prohibitions
such as those that are being proposed
and leveraged by the European Union human brain project
and throughout the world by things like
dual use research of concern treaties such as that
which was developed at ASOMR
are taken to heart and civilian
agencies institutions and organizations
are essentially sort of
debanded disbanded debarred
from their engagement in these
types of activities who then
will uptake the torch
increasingly there's been some interest
consideration and real discussion
as to reinvestment in government agencies
and government sponsored agencies
that are specifically and explicitly dedicated
to these pursuits so to avoid any
confusion what the intent is and to also
avoid any confusion as to who's doing what
we don't want to get another scenario
such as we do with Robert Oppenheimer looking at the
first test of the atomic bomb and going
what have I done I am death
Dr. Oppenheimer what did you think you were doing
we don't want to have those confusions
we want to make sure that in fact those who
engage the brain sciences for biomedical
purposes of wellness lifestyle
enhancing the human condition are not
necessarily confused with those who may then uptake
these things into Wynne's agenda
but if that's the case and these things
are moving more into governmental institutions
organizations and initiatives
are civilian ethics even
viable any longer and if
we engage military ethics what military
ethical principles will we engage
the use
development research surveillance
of these particular things for just war
and if in fact these things are not
used in a strictly warfare fashion
where war is declared by the use of these
agents yet they still tend to be bellicose
or disruptive can we then say
that we can justify their use
in other words not just a just war
but their just use within
this frame of conduct whatever this may be
and or can we revive
another older and less known
tradition which is called
use contra bellum which is justification
for the use to prevent warfare
here the use of the neural
cognitive sciences and intelligence
human terrain teams psychological
operations such as narrative networks
may be viable to deescalate
the volatility and vulnerability towards
violence and combativeness
but again we need to consider to what
level we will engage this and whether or not
the current ethics that we have in place
are viable and valuable to do this
and how these things can
then be rendered on the international scale
because if in fact this is going to
demand the multinational
global discourse that it will
then clearly the global relevance
of any ethical approach needs to be considered
and ethics very often is said to have
a big mouth but no teeth but
policies and international law has choppers
that can in fact be retributive and can bite
what do these developments
then incur for ongoing iterations
of biological toxins and weapons convention
as well as other treaties
policies and international laws
that may help to guide direct if not
regulate and govern the use of
these particular implements
so the situation we are faced with ladies and gentlemen
is as follows
as we begin to untangle the Gordian knot of the brain
to the development of neuroscience and technologies
we've come to the precarious position
of opening the proverbial can of worms
of if
how in what ways
to what extent and when
these techniques and technologies
will be used
in weaponized intelligence
and national security agenda
I submit to you ladies and gentlemen
that can has already been opened
it will be our job and increasingly your job
to be able to navigate
this new terrain
this brave new world and what it incurs
this is atlas
and the idea of atlas was that atlas
balanced the integrity and well being
of the world upon his shoulders
I disagree
atlas of the 21st century as you see here
balances the world upon
her head
what we know about the brain
what we are able to do with the brain
of all those organisms that are embodied and have one
that exist in their various environments
and ecologies
because the brain sciences and its technologies
confer tremendous capability
of knowledge
intervention
with tremendous capability comes tremendous power
with tremendous power
comes great responsibility
look that phrase is good enough for Spiderman
certainly was good enough for Goethe and Nietzsche
certainly good enough for me and I hand that off to you
because ladies and gentlemen
as I started this
neuroscience puts the brain at our fingertips
whether that's
help to heal
or to harm
is simply the effect of the human condition
and how we put this to play
you will in your professional careers
and your personal lives
see the brain sciences ever more infiltrated
and integrated not only into the battle space
but to the bedside
to the board room and beyond
they will be a part of your realistic lives
in the way we engage each other
regard each other treat each other
interact and perhaps
enter into combat
understanding the brain sciences and their power
will become one of your obligate responsibilities
not only as military officers
but as civilians of the 21st century
global space
I like to end a lecture like this
usually by giving you a little personal story
my dad
former navy man
was an engineer
and one of the things dad liked to do
was build stuff
he liked to tinker I still like to tinker
I like to work with tools
my dad was a really bright guy one of the things he did when I was a kid he'd come home every month and bring me a new tool
teach me how to use it
so in fairly short order as a young kid
I became pretty adroit
or at least I thought I was adroit with using tools
and with all of the impulsiveness
and zeal of youth
getting a new tool with only partial knowledge
I remember one day dad came home
and he said to me Jim here's a brand new tool
and I took it from him and I said thanks dad
and I went to go running off
my dad put his hand on my shoulder and he said Jim slow down
measure twice
cut once
sometimes you can't go back
ladies and gentlemen
these are the brain sciences
they can and they will increasingly be used in national security
intelligence and defense agenda globally
we need to measure twice
and cut once
and make sure that the cut that we make is one that is for good
one that is for right
and is one that does not cut our own throats
or the throats of others
in those ways that are irreparable
I leave you with my father's wisdom
these are some of our white papers that we've submitted
to the strategic multilayer assessment group of the joint staff of the pentagon
I can make these slides available
to you
these are now all open domain and available to your perusal
if you're interested in some of our ongoing work by my research group
I provide you with some of our own work
and this is the part of the lecture
I'm going to look right at the camera
that is the unabashed self promotional plug
if you're really interested in this I've only had the wonder and opportunity
to engage with you for about the past hour or so
if you're interested in going further down the rabbit hole
and reading about this in greater detail
granularity and specificity
I recommend this to you
not because I'm going to go out and buy the new Maserati when you all buy the book
but because I'm very proud of it
not because I wrote it
because I only really contributed a couple of chapters
I'm proud of it because
bringing this together was a multi-year effort
that grew out of a set of at first
somewhat sensitive but unclassified
and some classified conferences that we had
that were then subsequently declassified
and then also brought together international leaders
in the field of military science
bioengineering, neuroscience
philosophy, ethics and law
to provide their perspective
their lens
their vision and voice
to what's going on in this domain
at this point
with some speculation, vision
and proposition as to what may need to go on in the future
so it's able to opportunize
the capabilities of the brain sciences
and meet and be prepared for the challenges
that it offers in this space
at this point I'd like to thank you all for your attention
I hope I haven't bored you
if you wish to get in touch with me feel free
just put in your subject line USMA
so I don't think you're trying to sell me Viagra
not that I wouldn't buy it
but this way I know where it's coming from
so I'll get to your questions
feel free to email me
I will email you back
it may not be that day or even that week
because I may be busy or traveling
but I will in fact email you back
because that's my obligate responsibility to you
thank you ladies and gentlemen for your time
I appreciate it
if you guys have any questions
we have about 5-10 minutes
yes sir
it's not really a military question
I'm just curious what you think of Michael Pollan's new book
and his role in self-psychedelics
oh yeah
there have been a number of different books
the new book here is that the idea of psychedelic drugs
had some bad research and of course some of that bad research
was not only procedurally bad
it was based upon the font of knowledge we had at the time
having engaged in psychedelic research
not per...
well maybe some
having engaged in psychedelic research
one of my first projects actually was looking at
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ecstasy
under the United States Navy grant for the possibility
of weaponizing ecstasy as a volatile agent
as a viable agent particularly against submariners
so the understanding that the psychedelics
could in fact be used in a variety of different ways
inclusive of weaponization
is not new, we look back to the older projects
such as MK Ultra, Mind Control Ultra
which utilized lysergic acid
diethylamide and psilocybin
to be able to alter the cognitions, emotions
and behaviors of individuals to see if that could be leveraged
not only against our own people but against others
some of the whole brain washing, mind washing
mind changing effect
however one of the things we've come to recognize
is that the mechanisms of these psychedelic agents
is far more specific than
we thought and in fact
can be incurred at far lower doses
than were heretofore attempted either experimentally
or in social practice
so there's a regenerated interest
a revivified interest in reexamining
the mechanisms and effect of these psychedelic
compounds inclusive of lysergic acid
diethylamide, psilocybin
dimethyltryptamine
as well as some that are sort of borderline
on what might be considered psychedelic
such as the affiliate of drugs like MDMA
at micro doses
or sort of intermediate micro doses
not only to treat individuals
who've had particularly neuropsychiatric
spectrum disorders and there's a growing
body of research that would suggest
that even one time administration of a therapeutic
dose of LSD or psilocybin
and or MDMA may have
very profound therapeutic effects against certain
forms of PTSD and tractable depression
and beyond the military framework even certain
forms of psychosis
we also recognize that these things may be useful in treating
forms of TBI, treating other forms
of psychiatric and neuropsychiatric
disorders and may also be viable as performance
enhancers particularly if given
in a very specific regimen at a very controlled
asymmetry. So I think like so many other
things the more we're learning about the brain
suggests to us not only what we know but what we
didn't know, some of the errors
in our previous ways of experimentation
empiricism and that allows us to revisit these
things under a newer and I think more
granular perspective that I think may
demonstrate certain benefits
as well as giving rise to concern about
certain burdens and risks. So I think that it
certainly warrants continued
research and I think that we need to be cautious
in how we interpret that research and its
translational effect but I think there's great benefit
to be gained there. Did I answer your question?
Other questions?
Yes sir.
I had a similar question.
In regards to the neuro-enablement
of the warfighter
or intel operator, do you think one day
the military will change its stance towards
legalizing the use of pharmaceuticals
in new topics such as the Daphnil
or Adderall to
Yes, yes. In fact I can tell you
from ongoing research that's being done now by the Air Force Research
Laboratory that's looking not only
at the comparative use of what's called
nootropic agents, as you said, Modafinil and some of
the newer ones. They've been around for a
while but they're sort of new with regard to the light
of their potential utility. Some of those drugs
like as Paracetam, Prameracetam,
Oxiracetam, these have been around for a long
time but now we're understanding their mechanisms
a little bit better and we're recognizing how we may be able to use them
in concert with other agents, inclusive of something like
caffeine and or how we can also
utilize these agents at lower doses that are
much more safer dose that can also then
be co-potentiated through the use of various devices.
Here we're talking about the transcranial
devices such as transcranial magnetic stimulation
and transcranial electrical stimulation
and if you're interested in some of this work I refer you to a colleague
of mine who's at Air Force, he's a right pat
and his name is Andy McKinley.
Just look up some of Dr. McKinley's work in this area.
It's stellar. It's leading edge.
And the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research is funding a number of different projects
that are looking at exactly this
mechanism. Can we engage certain
brain substrates, nodes and networks
through the use of new pharmaceuticals
or older pharmaceuticals that are re-dosed
or pharmaceutically delivered in different
ways to be able to maximize
key aspects of the processes
of those neural functions that are operative in
key tasks for the intelligence operator or warfighter.
And in so doing, can we then
take a slightly different stance on our
postures towards the viability
and value of these drugs under controlled circumstances
for the warfighter intelligence operator
and I think that's the general idea.
Did I answer your question? Cool.
Other questions?
Going once.
Going twice.
Thank you all.